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I am taking this moment from my coursework to write to
you about an issue that has come up in my study, which you
and I spent so much time talking about during my last visit
with you. Lately, I have been thinking about the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) and the reasons that women have been di-
vided over the issue. I find myself thinking not just about wo-
men in general, but about you, my mother, Ernestine Bagley of
Chester, Pennsylvania. I want to share my thoughts with you
about the ERA, about divisions among women, and about divi-
sions within women whose social identity involves not only wo-
man-ness, but also Blackness.
I want to think with you because I miss you, because I
love you, and because whatever I believe about woman-ness,
about Blackness, and about the law begins with what you have
given me to believe about myself. If other women and men
want to listen in, I am confident that we, you and I, will not
mind. Indeed, I have even added footnotes to make our discus-
sion clearer to those who may not be familiar with some of the
Biblical, historical, literary, or legal references that are com-
monplace to you or me.
As you know, I am an advocate of the ERA. That advocacy
may seem moot since the ERA has just been effectively de-
feated. But I am convinced that the political struggle for the
ERA should and will continue as it has for at least the past
three score years.
I know that you are ambivalent about the ERA; you know
that your judgment of social-ethical issues has always deeply
affected my own. You may also know that, in my estimation,
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the significance of law is its role as the practical ideological
codification of dominant social and ethical norms. Thus, this
discussion is simultaneously concerned with personal, social,
and doctrinal legal issues that the ERA debate raises, all within
a framework of explicit ethical values.
Although the quest for a Constitutional amendment guar-
anteeing equality of the sexes in the law dates back to at least
1923, the starting point of this discussion is 1954. That year the
Supreme Court's decision, Brown v. Board of Education,' out-
lawed a racially segregated public school system. In Brown,
the Supreme Court actually reached a very narrow decision on
the issues raised by Linda Brown and her NAACP lawyers.
The Court did not, for instance, outlaw racially restrictive vot-
ing laws that denied our people the franchise in those jurisdic-
tions where most of us then lived. The Brown decision did not
strike down Jim Crow2 (apartheid) in public accommodations.
It did not declare illegal those galling classified ads for housing
and jobs, divided into "White" and "Colored" sections, that
were standard fare in our Chester, Pennsylvania Times. In-
deed, the Court did not even address de facto racial segrega-
tion in putatively unitary school systems like the public school
system which your children attended.
Still, Brown was a tremendous legal and symbolic victory
for us. Regardless of the legal-ese, we knew that the Court had
given in to the relentless extra-legal lobbying and agitation of
civil rights advocates. That is, without detracting from the per-
sonal brilliance of Charles Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and
the other NAACP lawyers, we knew (you knew better than I
did) that Brown was something our people had won. Brown
proved that we could win and win big. It signaled us to inten-
sify our struggle, to claim our rights in every sphere of life.
Without Brown, there might not have been the Montgomery
bus boycott and the emergence of the powerful direct action
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (held that the separate but equal doctrine had no place
in education systems and declared illegal the segregation of students by race).
The Supreme Court in Brown did not expressly overrule Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. "Jim Crow" is the colloquial term for the American system of apartheid or
racial segregation through which this country codified White Supremacy. It in-
volved restriction of Afro-Americans from white public facilities, white schools,
white seats on public conveyances, white housing, etc. Jim Crow often re-
quired posting "White" and "Colored" signs to designate segregated facilities.
Functionally, Jim Crow involved either dual systems or the exclusion of Afro-
Americans from a panoply of white citizenship rights and benefits. For a thor-
ough discussion of American apartheid, see C. Vann Woodward, The Strange
Career of Jim Crow (1955).
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movement, two short years later in 1956.3
Retrospectively, some may argue that we read too much
into Broum. The masses of us, ignorant of the fine and narrow
points of law, took Brown to mean that the highest Court of the
land had given us the green light to claim equality in all as-
pects of our social existence. Arguably, Dwight Eisenhower's
mandate that integration take place with "all deliberate speed"
was closer to the legal mark than the Negro's cry for "Freedom
Now!" But the symbolic meaning of Brown transcended legal
niceties and confirmed a new social and ethical norm that had
no authentic space for Jim Crow, White Supremacy, and the
"separate but equal" standard articulated in Plessy v. Fergu-
son 4 just before the turn of the century.
The ERA is likewise a legal symbol. The ERA has been a
rallying point for the broad political and cultural movement
seeking the equality of the sexes, demanding the liberation of
women. Resistance to the ERA is often obfuscated by appeals
to the traditional hierarchy of the patriarchal family. Anti-ERA
forces look to Biblical sanctions of female subordination to sup-
port their position: remember Paul's admonition to women to
keep silent in church.5 Legal scholars and judges have argued,
especially in family law areas, that relations between women
and men are more properly the preserve of local governments.
This anti-ERA indoctrination glaringly parallels pro-racist ap-
peals to tradition, to allegedly divine sanctions ("Slaves, obey
your masters."),6 and to racism masking as states' rights. Our
experience as Afro-Americans furnishes us with a unique abil-
ity both to recognize the powerful, practical value of legal sym-
bols and to see through the fogs of anti-egalitarian apologies for
Male Supremacy. Our experience is an historical precedent.
Thus, not surprisingly, race-related law has emerged as
the most useful paradigm for the formulation and adjudication
3. The Montgomery boycott story is stirringly and analytically chronicled in
Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom (1958) (see 151-53, 157-60 for
the interplay between mass protest strategies and litigation). Derrick Bell ar-
gues that, without the direct action protest movement, Brown would probably
have been a dead letter. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 279-361
(2d ed. 1980). Perhaps the most thorough discussion of the interplay between
legal rights and mass protest is Frances Piven & Richard Cloward, Poor Peo-
ple's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail, 181-263 (1977). See also,
Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait (1964).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that race-based segregated accommodations
for railway passengers were not violative of the fourteenth amendment if such
accommodations were equal in nature: the "separate but equal" doctrine).
5. 1 Corinthians 14:34.
6. Ephesians 6:5, Colossians 3:22, Titus 2:9.
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of laws and legal controversies related to sex. To a great ex-
tent, the evolution of sex discrimination law, especially in the
past score of years, has involved two recurrent themes:
whether legislatures should append "sex" to areas covered by
race-related anti-discrimination law, and whether courts should
interpret the category of "sex" like the category of "race" in
anti-discrimination law. The emergence of these themes
reveals the tendency toward confluence of race law and sex law
doctrines.
There is, however, still a great divide between race law
and sex law in this strange land. Race is a suspect classifica-
tion that triggers the presumption of wrongfulness. Allocation
of jobs on a racial basis, for example, invites strict scrutiny and
is, in the context of contemporary law,7 invidious discrimina-
tion, unless the allocation serves as a compensatory remedy for
effects of racial discrimination, e.g., affirmative action or some
other "compelling government interest."8 Gender-based dis-
tinctions must merely "serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives" in order to satisfy judicial scrutiny under the equal
protection clause to the Constitution.9 Furthermore, the courts
treat gender-based "benign discriminatien" much more ambig-
uously and leniently than race-based discrimination. In effect,
this means that women per se have less legal protection against
materially and psychically damaging discrimination than
Blacks have. Whether the legal protections are mirrored in real
world experience depends, of course, on various factors. For-
mal legal protections notwithstanding, the quality of justice af-
forded to women often turns upon whether the women are
7. We would be recklessly shortsighted to forget that the presumption of in-
vidiousness, with respect to racial classifications, is a fairly new Constitutional
standard. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Plessy upheld racial separation as
constitutionally permissible and affirmed segregation laws that were common-
place in both the North and South from before the birth of the Republic. See A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color:. Race and the American Legal
Process: The Colonial Period (1978). Not until its decision in Broum, a scant 29
years ago, did the Supreme Court finally assert that "separate but equal" is in-
herently 'unequal"
8. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (the
Court prohibited the allocation of a specific number of admissions to minority
students). United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (hold-
ing that Title VII did not prohibit employers or unions from seeking to remedy
racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories).
9. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that age-sex differentials
were an improper basis for an Oklahoma law permitting the sale of beer to wo-
men at age eighteen but not to men until age twenty-one). Oklahoma's stated
objective, traffic safety, failed under the Court's test.
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Black or white, rich or poor, welfare mothers or suburban
housewives, highly educated or functionally illiterate, well-paid
professionals or "cleaning ladies."
The passage of the ERA will elevate sex discrimination is-
sues to the same Constitutional level held by race discrimina-
tion issues. Under the ERA, gender-based classifications will
be as suspect as race-based classifications are, and the legal ar-
senal to defend the rights of women will be significantly ex-
panded. At the same time, the ERA will not magically
obliterate those biological differences between women and men
that might be juridically significant. In other words, using
cliche' examples, the laws governing wet-nurses or sperm-bank
donors would not cease to have differential applications to wo-
men and men since only women are potential wet-nurses and
only men are potential sperm donors as biological matters of
fact. I imagine these examples seem silly, but they serve to
highlight that there are relevant biological differences between
the sexes which the ERA will not affect any more than the
Brown decision has affected the pigment of our skin or our
right to select hair grooming products we feel most appropriate
for our nappy hair!
Indeed, the group which may benefit most materially from
the passage of the ERA is that of Afro-American women who
are often "triply jeopardized" by racism, sexism and economic
deprivation (the latter reflecting the feminization of poverty
and the fact that Black women are much more likely to be poor
than "our white sisters").10 The elevation of sex discrimination
to the same level of legal scrutiny as race discrimination, en-
compassing the "disparate impact" and affirmative action
precedents (not yet overturned by the Rehnquist Court),
10. In 1981, the median income for white women was $5,519. Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Money Income of Households, Families, and
Persons in the United States: 1981, Current Population Reports, Consumer In-
come, Series P-60, No. 137, Table 46, 153. The median income for Black women
was $4,903. Id. at 155. Correlatively, the median income for white households
in 1981 was $20,153 and for Black households was $11,309. Id. at Table 1, 5. Be-
cause one out of every three Black households in 1980 was maintained by a wo-
man, the conclusion that Black women are, as a whole, poorer than white
women is clear. Further, 66.9% of Black women in America earned less than
$8,000 for the year 1981. Id. at Table 39, 122. At the same time, 62.8% of white
women in America earned less than $8,000. Io Contrastingly, 31.6 * of Ameri-
can males earned less than $8,000 in 1981. Id. at 120. The median income in
1981 for white males was $14,296, id. at Table 46, 153, and the median income for
Black males for that same year was $8,501, id at 154.
For a discussion of the impact of racism on the Black family and on women
in the Black family, see Muhammad Kenyatta, In Defense of the Black Family:
The Impact of Racism, Monthly Review, March 1983, at 12.
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should be especially attractive to poor and working-class Black
women. The Brown-like symbol of the ERA should trigger en-
thusiastic support from Black women who, like you, have di-
rectly experienced Brown's liberating impact against Jim Crow.
Why then are so many of our mothers, our aunts, our
grandmothers, our older sisters, our role models and our coun-
selors ambivalent about the ERA? Please forgive my audacity
in hazarding an answer. I am cautious because of my relative
youth and the often clumsy blindness of my own sex. And let
me, in speaking about this ambivalence, revert to the "we"
voice that is most natural in our intimate conversation, for your
ambivalence gives me pause no matter what bold poses I might
strike.
We are ambivalent because we are afraid, lest anything
detract from our struggle against racism which has been the
central fact of our social, political, and economic lives. We have
grown accustomed to submerging the claims of woman-ness
lest we give the white masters a wedge to divide us from our
beleaguered men. We know these bourgeois feminists because
we have heard them divulge their intimacies, while oblivious to
us scrubbing their floors and serving their tables. We know
how much alike they are to their husbands, fathers, and broth-
ers whose chauvinism they berate. We simply do not, indeed,
cannot, trust them to see the scars where our own men have
wounded us.
We have been, many if not most of us, sustained by a faith
in the same Bible that the Phyllis Schlaflys and Jerry Falwells
have used as a weapon against us. We do incline an ear to the
religious rhetoric of the anti-feminist Rightists, even though we
ultimately reject their politics. Abortion is a troubling ethical
question for us. We are turned off by the apparent glibness of
the visible feminist leadership toward this question, even
though-or better to say, especially because-we have cradled
our crying daughters in our arms after counseling them to ter-
minate unplanned pregnancies. We have suffered too many
break-ups of our own marriages and yearned too often for hus-
bands who would indeed protect us from the vicious white-
made world to applaud cheerfully the deterioration of the fam-
ily-even though we ourselves have never played the vapid
Harriet to a banal Ozzie. We have fought for our daughters and
sons to gain entry into the American Dream; we find little joy
in the realization that that Dream is just another nightmare.
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We have been, as the poet Margaret Walker" intones, "be-
lievers," even when we knew more than we believed.
And, now, we are sometimes just simply tired. We have
hoped so high for the flowering of one revolution, the revolution
for racial justice in our children's lifetimes. And we watch
daily as our hopes wither, as too many of our peers-women
and men-shrivel toward pointless deaths after lives that seem
too often of no great moment. We watch as the glorious chil-
dren of our neighborhoods grow into embittered, fearsome,
dangerous brutes and our neighborhoods decay into impover-
ished anarchy. We are sometimes just too tired to re-invest our
broken hopes, again. I know.
But, Momma, you have prevailed. You have given me
strength even when you didn't know you had any left. Your
mended hopes have held better than good enough. As you
have moved on and on, through your tirednesses and ambiva-
lences, you have shown me how to move through my own
doubts. I am not writing to try to persuade you to become an
advocate of the ERA or of anything else; you know what you
know. And your example has taught me to trust my own
knowledge.
I am an advocate of the ERA, dearest woman, because you
have persuaded me of myself.
With love and gratitude,
Your son,
Muhammad
11. Margaret Walker Alexander, We Have Been Behevers in The Poetry of
Black America 145-46 (Arnold Adoff ed. 1973). The poem begins,
We have been believers believing in the black gods of an old land,
believing in the secrets of the seeress and the magic of the
charmers and the power of the devil's evil ones.
Reprinted by permission.
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